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International Law Codified and its Legal Sanction. By Pasquale Fiore. English
translation by Edwin M. Borchard. New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1918.
pp. xix, 750.
This is the English translation of the late Professor Fiore's well-known II
diritto internazionale codificato e la sua sanzione" giuridica, the first edition of
which was published in i889-i89o. When the third edition was exhausted, the
author revised and partly re-wrote the work, with the consequence that the fourth
edition, which was published in i9o9, represented almost a new work. He died
in December, 1914, after having prepared a fifth slightly-enlarged edition, which
was published in 1915 and the Italian text of which is the basis of the present
English translation. It ought to be said at once that Professor Borchard's
translation is most excellent; it is written in thoroughly idiomatic English,
and no one would know that the work is a translation were it not that the title
page informs the reader of the fact. And it ought likewise to be mentioned
that Professor Borchard has added a valuable introduction and a number of
valuable notes of his own to the text of the author.
In its fourth and fifth editions the work is intended to be a codification of
International Law, although the author distinctly says that at the present
time a codification of International Law in its entirety is impossible, and that
it can only be attained step by step by codifying separate parts of International
Law. If nevertheless he offers a .co.ification, his intention is to show how a
codified International Law in its entirety would present itself provided all his
views were adopted. Naturally his codification embraces a good deal of the
positive International Law in force because the author is very far from assert-
ing that the bulk of the existing International Law does not stand the test
of criticism. However, his work comprise$ not only rules which considerably
deviate from the corresponding rules of the International Law in force, but
also a great many rules to which no rules of the existing positive law cor-
respond. It is a merit of the work that, in most cases, it becomes clearly apparent
whether a rule is one of the rules of International Law in force or a rule- of
"rational law," the law of reason as it appears to the author, which ought to
become positive law.
Fiore was born in 1837 and was appointed as early as 1863 to the first of the
several Chairs of International Law which he successively adorned during his
long life, namely that at the University of Urbino. Thus he was educated, and
began his work as a teacher and writer on International Law, at a time when
Positivism in International Law had not yet carried the day, and when inter-
national lawyers belonged mostly either to the school of Naturalists or that of
the Grotians. Fiore was from the very beginning, and remained till the last
day of his life, a Grotian, and he therefore gives equal attention to the natural
(rational) Law of Nations and the positive Law of Nations. Apart from this,
his work shows traces of doctrines- which can no longer be upheld. For
instance-see sec. 1546 of the present work-he still adheres to the nowadays
impossible doctrine of the substituted sovereignty of the belligerent who mili-
tarily occupies enemy territory. Again, he still teaches the nowadays antiquated
rule-see sec. 1721 of the present work-that a belligerent may continue in
neutral waters "against an enemy merchant ship an attack and pursuit for




Very peculiar are the attitude and the rules of the author with regard to
naturalization. Whereas according to sec. 658 it is one of the international
rights of man that he may renounce the citizenship of a country and may-
see sec. 654--"freely choose the State to which he wishes to belong and when
he has fulfilled all the conditions fixed by the legislature he may demand
recognition of his citizenship and the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges
granted to citizens," sec. 696 lays down the'astonishing rule that he shall be
held guilty of a felony and treason who shall take up arms against his native
country even when he has renounced his nationality, and that no civilized
State can compel naturalized citizens to take up arms against their native
country. The author overlooks, firstly, that if an individual has a right to
renounce his citizenship by birth, thereby all ties of allegiance to his native
country are severed, and, secondly, that if he becomes naturalized, and takes
the oath of allegiance to another country, the latter must have a right to
demand from him the fulfilment of all the difties of a citizen by birth, duties
amongst which the taking up of arms against an enemy is one of the most
primal, even if the enemy be his native land.
The purpose of the work is to offer a codification of the Law of Humanity
based on historical, scientific, and rational sources. The author knows very well
that International Law, as the very term "international" denotes, is a law
between States only and exclusively, and he thinks it might be better to employ
the expression "Law of Mankind" for his code of the Law of Humanity,
but he nevertheless clings to the title "International Law." In his opinion one
of the objects of International Law should be to determine the international
rights and reciprocal duties belonging to every member of humanity, and he
distinguishes three groups of such members, namely States, individual human
beings, and the Churches, particularly the Roman Catholic Church. He gives
the name of Magna Civitas to the ensemble of all the States, all the human
beings, and all the Churches. His code provides therefore not only rules
defining international rights and duties of States but also international rights
and duties of all human beings, of the Churches, and of independent tribes.
Yet the author is far from contending that individual human beings, Churches,
and States are international persons of the same kind, he only claims that indi-
vidual human beings and Churches enjoy an international personality juribus
suis, and not as subjects of States, with the consequence that the enjoyment of
civil rights by foreigners as well as natives cannot be deemed to depend upon
arbitrary concession on the part of any State but is properly to be considered
as the legal recognition of international rights of individual human beings.
Another object of the present work is to offer a method of formulating and
pronouncing the rules which should constitute the law of humanity, to make
such rules binding as really are law, ind to ensure their universal respect.
Three institutions are proposed by the author for this purpose, namely the
Congress, the, Conference, and the Court of Arbitration. The Congress is to
be the legislative assembly of humanity, to be composed not only of the repre-
sentatives of the States but also of members directly elected by the peoples
of all the States. The Congress, however, is not to be a permanent institu-
tion, but should convene only whenever the historical exigencies of humanity
require the declaration of new rules or the modification of existing rules. The
Conference is to be the executive organ of humanity, and is to be constituted
by each Congress before it dissolves. The task of the Conference is to apply
the legal rules initiated by the Congress, to order references to arbitration, to
regulate collective interventions, and the like. The Conference ensures respect
for its decisions by proposing to the Congress the use of coercive mneasures
against such a State as may refuse to execute its decisions. However, neither
the Congress, nor the Conference, nor the Court of Arbitration will make strife
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and war impossible, and the author therefore offers in his Code a body of
rules respecting war and neutrality which to a great extent follow the lines of
the several Hague Conventions concerned.
Looking upon the work as a whole, the fact that it comes from the pen of the
leader of Italian thought in the science of International Law would suffice to
secure to it the attention of the world, but there is also its intrinsic value
which must appeal to every reader. It stands to reason that no one will agree
with every single rule laid down by the author. For instance, the present writer
is of opinion that, as long as International Law remains what it is, namely a
law between and not above States, international rights of individuals are an
impossibility, although, of course. the States could agree by an international
treaty that every member of the Family of Nations should be obliged by its
Municipal Law to grant certain rights to human beings, natives as well as
aliens. Yet, whatever may be its imperfections, Fiore's Code is an important
work and will always be greatly appreciated. It will quicken thought wherever
it is read, and it is therefore particularly welcome at the present time when the
World'War has rent humanity into two hostile camps. Victory of the Allies
will vindicate International Law and lay the foundation of a peace which will
again unite suffering humanity. The voice of a constructive scholar which
resounds through Fiore's work will then find sympathetic ears. Although many
of his proposals will hardly be realized the idealistic spirit that pervades them
will act as a fertilizer. Hearty thanks are due to the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and to. Professor Borchard for the English translation
which secures to the work a wide range of readers in America and in all parts
of the British Empire.
L. OPPEN Hm
Cambridge (England)
Cases on Future Interests and Illegal Conditions and Restraints. By Albert M.
Kales. St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 1917. pp. xxvi, 1455. $6.oo.
According to the preface, this volume is a revision of volume 5 and part of
volume 6 of Gray's Cases on Property, with inclusion of new subjects and further
development of others. "The effort has been to follow Mr. Gray's work as
closely as possible, not to find some different arrangement just as good." The
result in statistical form is one volume of convenient thickness, containing 1450
pages, exclusive of index and table of cases, as against 1433 pages of Gray;
with about 2oo cases omitted and 125 cases and selections from various other
authorities added. The omissions are largely by dropping the sixth volume
titles of fraudulent conveyances, registration, joint ownership, curtesy and dower,
and election and conversion. All of these titles may well be treated in other
courses, and in any event the reviewer's experience and observation at the Har-
vard Law School demonstrated that there was seldom time in the advanced
property course for more than a summary consideration of them.
As to the subjects retained, the cases omitted are for the most part early
decisions and those added are, with few exceptions, comparatively recent. It
is difficult to determine for pedagogical purposes the extent to which cases show-
ing the origin and development of the law, but otherwise obsolete, should give
way to those stating the present law. Mr. Kales in general emphasizes the
latter. In the largest and most important subject of perpetuities, however, he
has wisely retained almost every case, adding thereto about a dozen.
As to the additions in general, the reviewer has not had an opportunity to
make detailed study, but on the whole the material appears to be instructive and
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teachable. The editor has, however, yielded somewhat to the temptation to
include cases turning on the construction of particular phrases, and cases from
his own bailiwick, the state of Illinois, even where local statutes are involved.
The order of cases has been somewhat improved for teaching purposes by
grouping those on particular points instead of adhering to the chronological
development of the whole topic where the topic is a large one. Here again it
is difficult to strike a balance between the demands of orderly research and the
limitations of classroom progress. Neither, however, seems to justify placing
Pells v. Brown (162o) and other authorities-largely Illinois cases-on the devel-
opment of indestructible springing and shifting uses before Chudleigh's case
(I594) and others on contingent remainders and their destructibility. In the
Moot case on page 121, Mr. Kales himself shows the proper historical relation-
ship, and no pedagogics appear to demand a reverse order.
Mr. Gray's second edition is ten years old. A considerable readjustment of
the sixth volume has long been impending. The army of lawyers whb have
sat at his feet and mourn his death have every reason to appreciate Mr. Kales'
endeavor, to quote from his preface, that his master's "collection of cases and
his analysis of the subjects dealt with shall continue to live and serve the great
body of law students of the Country."
CHARLEs F. DuTcH.
Boston
Criminal Sociology. By Enrico Ferri. (Modem Criminal Science Series.)
Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1917. pp. 577.
We owe a considerable debt of gratitude to the learned translators, each of
whom has suffered an untimely death, Joseph L Kelly and John Lisle, for their
well-performed task in translating for us this work, so well known abroad, by
Enrico Ferri, sociologist, socialist leader in the Italian parliament and Pro-
fessor of Criminal Law in the University of Rome. A first small edition of
this book appeared in 1884; an English abridged translation, for years on
the shelves of our libraries, has most inadequately represented the scholarship
which marks the author's work.
To identify the author better we may use the very well-phrased paragraph
from the editorial preface: "Ferri may be regarded as Lombroso's most dis-
tinguished pupil, and, in a sense, as a continuer of his work, though supplement-
ing it on the sociological side and giving it a greater breadth than Lombroso
himself showed. Ferri's work on Criminal Sociology may be regarded, there-
fore, as epoch-making, in bringing together the anthropological studies of
Lombroso and his own work in criminal statistics and in criminal law, resulting
in the founding in Italy of a new school of positive criminal law, of which Ferri
is himself the chief exponent."
Ferri covers a large field in his work, and covers it with distinction, using
a vast array of facts and showing familiarity with the views of many authors.
Indeed it is his orientation of his own point of view in relation to other writers
and his occasional, but not overdone, discussion of the conflicting theoretical
schools of criminology that makes the perusal of his treatise an intellectual
treat. And his dissertation is altogether to the point, for the last part nf the
volume consists of seven chapters under the caption of Practical Reforms-a
well-balanced consideration of the machinery of public justice and penal
administration.
Of course it is impossible to offer here in detail any account of these pro-
posed reforms or of Ferr's theories, to which he so tenaciously clings. He
lays stress all through on his fivefold classification. of criminals, on certain
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sociological laws which he believes determine the crime out-put of society and
he emphasizes approvingly the clinical attitude towards the individual problem.
Thus he brings together several points of view.
There is a good deal of shrewd common sense distributed throughout Ferri's
handling of his many topics, e. g., while he says that, given social conditions
as they are, the criminal act may be, and often is, an act determined by neces-
sity on the part of a person inevitably predisposed by nature to crime, neverthe-
less the State has also its own predetermined necessities. If the criminal says
to the State, "Why do you punish me for an act from which it is impossible
for me to abstain?" the State can reply, "For the sole reason that I likewise
am unable to abstain from punishing you in the defense of law and society."
Then also Ferri insists wisely that crime is always the product of the nature
of the man plus the environment. And particularly valid is his emphasis on the
fact that is growing more and more apparent, that "neglected childhood is the
source and seed of habitual criminality and recidivity."
While respecting the eminent soundness of much that appears in the work,
fairness to the science of criminology as it has now developed demands at least
some remark on the limitations of Ferri's conclusions. In the first place he
writes about material derived almost entirely from the Latin races and, then,
while he freely acknowledges the part that study of the 'mind must come to
play in criminology, his data of mental life are a hundred-fold less complex
than modern studies in psychology show. Strangely naive is Ferri's repeated
statement that when he goes out into the practical field he can pick out types,
especially the murderer type--"I distinguished it in one young soldier out of
seven hundred." Of course we are well aware that America does not cor-
respond at all to Italy in the findings of stigmata among the population, but
generalizations should hold true in other than one's own locality. Nowhere
do we find students here so easily passing on past or present conduct possi-
bilities in the individual, even of peculiar appearance. The reviewer confesses,
too, that Ferri's attempt to formulate a "Law of Criminal Saturation" lacks
impressiveness because its statement that--"in a given social environment with
definite individual and physical conditions a fixed number of delicts, no more
and no less, can be committed"--is so broad that the modifications of a
delinquenes career which may be made and which do lessen crime are included-
of course they form from their very inception part and parcel of the social
environment or the individual or physical conditions.
The true value of such work as Ferri's in criminological science is at the
present day to be estimated only in light of the fact that modern studies of
the mental life concerning native capabilities, traits, and dynamic experiences
present a new phase of the subject which in-its direct applicability to the indi-
vidual problem and hence to the prevention of crime in general overshadows
in practicability all other and, particularly, theoretical considerations.
WIMaAM HEALY
